OSAM-1 Fallout: Lessons from a Troubled Program
On March 1, NASA terminated a $2 billion program to create a refueling satellite, the On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing 1 (OSAM-1). The nine-year effort, previously called Restore-L, is the second satellite servicer program Maxar backed out of, following DARPA’s RSGS in 2019. In a scathing report, NASA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) put the blame for OSAM-1 squarely on Maxar, referring to “poor” contractor performance no less than 13 times. At first glance, the blame seems sound, but an equally critical take from an OSAM-1 subcontractor tells another story.
Tethers Unlimited (an AMERGINT company) was building MakerSat, an attachment to OSAM-1 intended to manufacture a carbon fiber composite beam in space. Former CEO Rob Hoyt took to LinkedIn to call out what he views as a “fundamental problem with NASA's approach to the ‘Public/Private Partnership’ method.” Per Hoyt, NASA’s definition of a “partner” looks much more like a traditional “customer.” Instead of working together, NASA often changes mission scope, increasing costs while expecting the partner/contractor to pay for it.
Quilty’s QuickTake:
• There’s equal blame to go around. Hoyt’s story gives credence to NASA being the root cause of some issues with OSAM-1, more so than the OIG report would imply. Maxar, on the other hand, appears to be stumbling over the same challenges it had with other space missions. Flight software glitches, which delayed Maxar’s own WorldView Legion constellation, were also negatively impacting OSAM-1.
• Industry moves too fast to tolerate lengthy delays. When OSAM-1 started, the idea of refueling large, old satellites held a lot of promise. But annual commercial GEO orders have been cut in half since 2015 and many of the new orders have electric propulsion, meaning they won’t run out of fuel for decades (nor can they use the hydrazine OSAM-1 was to deliver). Low Earth Orbit constellations of redundant and/or disposable satellites have become the norm, crimping demand for refuelers. NASA apparently concluded that, even once transferred to a commercial operator, OSAM-1 wasn’t well positioned for emerging sustained maneuvering/maneuver without regret initiatives from DoD.
• Realism was in short supply. NASA awarded Maxar the Restore-L contract in 2016, with an expected delivery in 2018 and a launch in June 2020. That would be reasonable if Restore-L, and now OSAM-1, wasn’t packed with new, unproven technologies. While a traditional large satellite takes around three years to build, new, complex satellites always take longer (see ViaSat-3, Eutelsat Quantum, and PRISMA as examples). NASA described Restore-L as nearing Technology Readiness Level 6 (out of 9) back in 2019 – a far cry from the kind of mature tech that could hold to a tight schedule. Congress provided ample funding, but the schedule for the program showed unrealistic expectations.
• Commercial partners need a profit motive. Maxar made clear to NASA that OSAM-1 was no longer a profitable effort. Unsurprisingly, it went the same way as RSGS, which Maxar also ended over unprofitability. NASA has the two-pronged challenge of wisely stewarding taxpayer dollars while also ensuring a profitable outcome for its commercial partner. Contractors, in turn, need to be sure that they can handle the work they agree to, including changes in scope that require additional expenditures.
SOURCE: https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/03/nasa-cancels-a-multibillion-dollar-satellite-servicing-demo-mission/